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SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT: HAVE THE
RULES CHANGED
IN MASSACHUSETTS? *
THOMAS

H.

SEYMOUR

**

Employers are generally liable for their employees' torts,
under respondeat superior principles, if those torts occur within the
employees' "scope of employment."! Until quite recently, Massa
chusetts courts applied, with relative consistency, a three-part test
for scope of employment developed by the Supreme Judicial Court
("SJC") in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc. 2
With Clickner v. City of Lowell,3 however, the SJC may have sig
naled a desire to turn away from Wang's approach to scope of em
ployment and to restrict employer liability for employee torts
noticeably more than it has in the past. What is troubling about
Clickner is that the outcome reached in the case resulted from
questionable reasoning; moreover, the court seemed unaware that
it had significantly departed from Wang's straight-forward scope of
employment test or· the implications of that departure. Thus,
Clickner may have confused more· than clarified Massachusetts
scope of employment law .
. The first part of this Article analyzes the three elements of the
scope of employment test articulated in Wang. The second part dis
cusses the Clickner case and explores the potential ramifications of
that decision for scope of employment jurisprudence In
Massachusetts.
Copyright © 1997 by Thomas H. Seymour. All rights reserved.
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
B.A., University of Nebraska; M.A., Simon Fraser University; J.D., Harvard. Many
thanks go to the students in my legal practice courses at Suffolk University Law School
and Michigan Law School, who helped me immeasurably to sharpen my understanding
of Massachusetts scope of employment law.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) ("A master is sub
ject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.").
2. 501 N.E.2d 1163 (Mass. 1986).
3. 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996).
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THE WANG SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT TEST

In 1977, Wang contracted with Dudley L. Post (whose business
was later named Business Incentive, Inc.) to help Wang find ways to
save on its taxes. 4 Post's compensation was to be a third of any
savings. 5 Over the course of three years Post saved Wang hundreds
of thousands of dollars in taxes. 6 A year or so after contracting
with Post, Wang hired Lawrence Joseph as its "one-person tax de
partment."7 Joseph began to supervise Post's activities, and at one
point Joseph circulated a memorandum to his supervisors, stating
that "Post's services could be performed in-house, and that Post's
fees could be eliminated."8 When Wang was unable to buyout
Post's contract, the company terminated it and sued Post for alleged
violations of the contract. 9 Post counter-sued Wang for the unpaid
fees owed him.lO Wang argued that it could not be held liable be
cause "Joseph's conduct leading to the termination of Post's con
tract was not the kind of conduct he was employed to perform."ll
Wang noted that "Joseph was not directed by anyone at Wang to
review Post's work under the contract but [Joseph] just sort of
moved out and ... got involved on his own."12
To decide the question of Wang's liability, the SJC needed to
determine whether Joseph's conduct was within his scope of em
ploymentP The court established in Wang that an employee's con
duct is within "the scope of [his] employment [1] if it is of the kind
he is employed to perform; [2] if it occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits [of his employment]; and [3] if it is
motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer."14
An employee's conduct must pass all three parts of the Wang testto
be within his or her scope of employment. 15
Joseph's activities as a "junior manager" at Wang and as
4.

See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Mass.

1986).

5.
6.
7.

See id.
See id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1164.
8. Id. at 1164-65.
9. Id. at 1165.
10. See id. at 1164.
11. Id. at 1167.
12. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the
superior court judge's findings).
13. See id. at 1166.
14. Id. (citations omitted).
15. See id.
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Wang's "in-house" tax consultant,16 the SJC decided, were clearly
"the kind of conduct he was employed to perform and that [con
duct] occurred within the authorized limits of time and space."17
The only remaining question concerned Joseph's motives. The SJC
acknowledged that "Joseph's 'alliance with Post was broken with an
intent to advance [Joseph's] own interests within the corpora
tion."'18 Nevertheless, because Joseph was attempting "to obtain
the benefits of Post's contract for Wang without cost," Joseph had
acted, in part, "with an intent to serve Wang."19 Wang was thus
"legally responsible for the losses incurred by Post," as Joseph's
conduct passed all three part of the Wang test for scope of
employment.2o
Since Wang, this three-part test has dominated scope of em
ployment law in Massachusetts. Not all three factors are in dispute
in every lawsuit, of course. Nearly all post-Wang courts, however,
have used the Wang test to shape their scope of employment analy
ses. 21 As well, both pre- and post-Wang courts agree that "[t]he
scope of [an employee's employment should] not [be] construed re
strictively in [Massachusetts]."22
A.

The "Job" test

The first part of the Wang test asks whether the employee was
doing his or her job, doing what he or she was hired to doP Some
Id. at 1164.
17. Id. at 1167. No mention was made of Joseph's actual location during the time
that he was working to end Post's relationship with Wang. For a discussion of the "time
and space" test as applied in Wang, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
18. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1167 (quoting the superior court judge's findings).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co. (In
re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (applying
Massachusetts scope of employment law), affd, 968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992); Burroughs
v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1996); Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663
N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996); Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996);
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990); Pinshaw
v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988); Howard v. Town of Bur
lington, 506 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1987); Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993); International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc.,
575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
22. Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983) (citing Pridgen
v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974»; see also Howard, 506 N.E.2d at
105 (citing Jerez, 547 N.E.2d at 1108); Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (quoting Howard,
506 N.E.2d at 105).
23. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
16.
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times this question is ,easy for the court to determine; sometimes
not. Blue-collar jobs, which have readily discernible boundaries,
are particularly easy. For example, in.Kelly v. Middlesex Corpora
tion,24 the employee in question, Sergio Peluffo, was apparently a
construction worker. 25 Peluffo became involved in an auto accident
while driving from his home to his job site to pick up his
paycheck.26 The accident victim sued both Peluffo and his em
ployer, Middlesex Corporation. 27 The appeals court, noting that
Peluffo had not been told to pick up his check, nor was he being
paid to do so, determined that Peluffo was not, engaged in the work
he was employed to perform at the time of his accident. 28 There
fore, the appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment against
Middlesex Corporation. 29
Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Polir:;e Officers" Lo
cal 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc. ,30 the appeals court decided that an
employee at Memorial Press, who intentionally altered an adver
tisement in a newspaper, was doing what he or she was hired to
do. 31 In one sense, of course, the employee obviously, was not do
ing his or her job; surreptitiously altering ad copy is hardly what
newspapers employ people to do. If, however, courts determined
the "job" requirement by assessing whether employees were doing
their jobs properly, then employers would never be held vicariously
liable for the actions of their employees, since no one is ever em
ployed to do his or her job improperly, let alone to commit torts.
The question, rather, is whether the employee was doing his or her
24. 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
25. It was never revealed exactly what work Peluffo did. The court reported only
that Peluffo worked at a job site that Middlesex's job superintendent shut down when it
began to rain and sent his men home. See id. at 474, 475.
26. See id. at 475. Peluffo's supervisor had given Peluffo the option of Collecting
his paycheck when he arrived at work the following Monday, or of driving to the shut
down job site on Friday to collect it. See id. at 474. J>eluffo chose the latter option. See
~

,

27. See id.
28. See id. 475-76.
29. See id. at 474.
30. 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
31. See id. at 377-78. While collective bargaining was going on between the Plym
outh Police Department and the town, one of the town's selectmen criticized the police
men for spending too much time at a doughnut shop. See id. In response, the police
union placed an ad with the Old Colony Memorial, published by Memorial Press, the
headline of which read: '''Plymouth Police Department Is Undermanned:'" Id. at 378.
When the ad appeared in the newspaper, "the second 'e' in the word 'Department'
looked like a doughnut." Id. The police union sued Memorial Press "for libel, deceit,
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch.] 93A." Id.
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job at all. In Memorial Press, therefore, the intentional misprint
passed the first element of the Wang test because the unknown em
ployee was, after all, helping to print the newspaper, and "the alter
ation of the advertisement occurred in the regular course of
production . .0. ."32
White-collar employment, however, is not so easily delineated.
Because of this, and because of the general belief that an em
ployee's scope of employment should not be construed restric
tively33 to determine whether an employee's questioned conduct
was "of the kind he was employed to perform,"34 courts often look
less at that person's "formally described" duties and more at his or
her "actual and customary" ones. 35
In Howard v. Town of Burlington, for example, the chairwo
man of Burlington's finance committee; Paula Davis, was an em
ployee without formally described duties. 36 A group of taxpayers
sought to enjoin the town from indemnifying Davis in a defamation
action brought against her for statements she apparently made dur
ing a meeting with Burlington's chief administrative officer, Robert
Mercie'r, concerning whether the town should purchase a new am
32. Id. at 378. Ultimately, Memorial Press was held not to be liable for the un
known employee's intentional misprint because the appeals court decided that the em
ployee's reasons for altering the ad were purely personal; thus his or her conduct failed
the "motive" test, the third part of the Wang test. See id. at 378-79. For a discussion of
Wang's "motive" test, see infra Part I.C.
The difference between an employee intentionally doing a job badly and not doing
. it at all potentially makes all the difference in whether the employer is liable or not.
One would therefore expect courts to agonize a little over what distinguishes work pur
posefully done incorrectly from conduct that is not work in the first place. But they
evidently do not. In 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co.
(In re 604 Columbia Avenue Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd,
968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992), for example, the court decided that a bank employee who
agreed to recommend a loan agreement to his Executive Committee only after he had
negotiated a kickback for himself was doing what he was employed to do. See id. at
355-57,371. This bank employee was performing the kind of work he was employed to
perform, the court said, because his duties "included deciding whether loans should be
approved and on what terms. .. and negotiating loan agreements ...." Id. at 371. It
was apparently irrelevant to the court that one of those terms was clearly tortious and
would surely have been unacceptable to the bank, had it known of it. Perhaps judges
recognize the difference between "job" and "not job" when they see it, but are unable
to define it.
33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
.' 0 . 3!4. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass.
01986) (citation omitted).
35. Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105-06 (Mass. 1987) (citing
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958».
36. See id. at 106.
00

•

0

0
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bulance. 37 "Davis did not meet with Mercier at the request or or
der of the finance committee, and no other members of the
committee were present. "38
After a bench trial, a superior court judge enjoined the town
from indemnifying Davis because "when 'she walked into Mercier's
office she left her official identity behind.'''39 The SJC reversed,
finding "no direct evidence to support the conclusion that Davis
met with Mercier as a private citizen and not as a committee chair
woman."40 On the contrary, the court said, the responsibilities of
the town's finance committee were "broad," and discussing whether
Burlington needed a new ambulance was "certainly a subject within
the official concern of the committee and its chairwoman."41 Con
versing with other town officials about town problems, in other
words, was the kind of work Davis was employed to perform be
cause it was the sort of thing she did and because she was not pre
cluded from doing it. 42 Put this way, the court's reasoning sounds
circular. However, for many employees, such as Davis, there is no
credible way to determine what their job is other than to look at
what they ordinarily do.
The SJC dealt with a similarly ill-defined employment situation
in Wang itself.43 Wang argued that its employee; Lawrence Joseph,
had not been directed to review the performance of an outside con
sultant, Dudley Post; rather, Joseph "just sort of moved out and ...
got involved on his own."44 The SJC, however, confirmed the trial
court's determination that Joseph was indeed doing what Wang had
hired him to do. 45 Joseph, "a junior manager [employed] to con
duct [Wang's] in-house tax affairs,"46 was in general doing what he
was hired to do when he began to supervise Post, and when he fig
ured out a way for Wang to avoid paying Post many thousands of
dollars each year.47 Of perhaps even greater importance to the
court was that "Joseph's appraisals of Post's services and his in
37. See id. at 103-04.
38. Id. at 104.
39. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's opinion).
40. Id. at 105.
41. Id. at 104-05.
42. See id. at 106.
43. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass.
1986).
44. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the
superior court judge's findings).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1164.
47. See id. at 1165.
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volvement with Post's contract were repeatedly endorsed and uti
lized by Wang's executives. "48 An employer implicitly signals,
therefore, that an employee is doing what he or she was hired to do
when the employer "uses" or "endorses" an employee's conduct.
The limits of an employee's employment thus can expand (or pre
sumably contract) depending on the employer's response to the em
ployee's actions.
Both Howard's "actual and customary" and Wang's "endorsed
and utilized" approaches to Wang's test were employed by the SJC
in Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission. 49 After a verbal
altercation with Frederick Monk, a Metropolitan District Commis
sion ("MDC") policeman, Alan Pinshaw, complained to Monk's su
pervisors. 50 When Monk was notified of Pinshaw's civilian
complaint, he sought and obtained a criminal complaint against Pin
shaw "for failing to comply with an order to move his car on re
quest of an MDC officer .... "51 The complaint against Pinshaw
was dismissed, and Pinshaw subsequently won a civil rights suit
against Monk in federal court. 52 Pinshaw then filed an action in the
superior court to force the MDC and the commonwealth to indem
nify Monk. 53
At trial the superior court judge granted the defendant's mo
tion for summary judgment, concluding that Monk's prosecution of
the criminal complaint against Pinshaw was part of Monk's" 'pri
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta'" against Pinshaw and not
within the scope of Monk's employment. 54 On appeal the SJC re
versed. 55 The court determined that Monk's conduct, even though
it resulted in a successful civil rights action against him, was of the
kind he was employed to perform because "[p]rosecution of crimi
nal complaints for violations of MDe regulations [was] part of
Monk's job. [And t]he fact that Monk's superiors knew of the re
taliatory action is some evidence that they may have endorsed or
48. [d. Similar language appears in Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission,
524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988), where the SJC thought that the employer's awareness of
the employee's tortious conduct was "some evidence that [the employer] may have en
dorsed or ratified [the employee's] action." [d. at 1357.
49. 524 N.E.2d at 1357.
50. See id. at 1353.
51.

[d.

52. See id. at 1353-54.
53. See id. at 1354.
54. [d. at 1356-57 (quoting the superior court judge's decision).
55. See id. at 1353.
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ratified Monk's action."56
That Monk performed his job badly, even deliberately so, did
not phase the SJC, just as the court of appeals was not phased by
the employee's intentional misprint of an ad in Memorial Press. 57
Because courts liberally interpret "scope of employment,"58 an em
ployee is doing what he or she has been hired to do, even if he or
she is doing it miserably, as long as the employee's conduct is of the
general type that he or she usually does, or the employer knows
what the employee is doing and fails to object. 59 Only if an em
ployee does something that he or she clearly was not directed or
paid to dO,60 or that is completely inconsistent with the employer's
general practices or policies,61 will that conduct fail Wang's "job"
test and fall outside the employee's scope of employment, relieving
the employer of liability.
B.

The "Time and Space" Test

In addition to passing the "job" test, an employee's conduct is
not within his or her scope of employment unless it also "occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits" of his or
her employment. 62 This second element of the Wang test appar
ently intends to strike a balance between two competing concerns.
On the one hand, if employers are not in a position to supervise and
control their employees, they should not be liable for their employ
ees' torts. This explains why an employee's conduct falls within his
Or her scope of employment only if it occurs within the authorized
time and space limits of the job.63 On the other hand, courts gener
ally choose not to interpret. scope of employment restrictively.64
56. Id. at 1357.
57. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1357; Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506
N.E.2d 102, 105-06 (Mass. 1987); Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501
N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass. 1986).
60. See, e.g., Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815, 818, 820 (Mass. 1996)
(finding that an assistant store manager's alleged sexual assault and rape of a store
employee was not "the kind of action that Purity Supreme employed him to perform");
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 967 (Mass. 1990)
(finding that day-care center employees' alleged sexual assault of children in their care
was not what they were employed to do).
62. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
63. See id.
64. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Defining the time and space limits of an employee's job too literally
or too rigidly would defeat that goal. This explains why, to fall
within an employee's scope of ~mployment, his or her conduct must
occur only substantia~ly within the authorized time and space limits
of that employment.65
As is true of the first element of the Wang test, the second
element is sometimes easy to determine and sometimes more diffi
cult. As a general rule, it seems easier for courts to determine what
the "authorized time and space limits" are for blue-collar employ
ees than for white-collar employees. Sergio Peluffo, the construc
tion worker in Kelly who was involved in an auto accident as he
drove from his home to his closed-down "job site" to pick up his
paycheck, is a clear example. 66 . Peluffo's employer had not in
structed him to pick up his paycheck.67 So his "travel[ing] between
[his] place of residence and place of business [was not] a mission to
further the purposes of [his] employer."68 Thus, the appeals court
concluded that the highway where the accident occurred was not
within the authorized space limits of Peluffo's employment. 69 In
Memorial Press, the unknown employee's conduct took place "sub
stantially within the authorized time and space limits"70 of his or
her employment because the intentional misprint of a newspaper ad
copy "occurred in the regular course of the production of the news
paper .... "71 These two cases concern employees with well-de
fined work areas and hours, making it apparently easy for the
courts to determine whether the employees' conduCt fell "substan~
tially" within or without the time and space limits of their
employment. 
A policeman's job, on the other hand, has much less clearly
defined time and space limits. Twice since the Wang decision, the
SJC has had to determine whether. a policeman's tortious conduct
occurred within the scope of employment.72 In Pinshaw the answer
65. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
66. See Kelly v. Middlesex Corporation; 616 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Mass. ~pp. Ct.
1993).
67. See id. at 475.'
. 68. Id.
69. See id. at 475-76.
70. International Bhd. of Police Officers v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376,
.
'378 (Mass~ App. Ct. 1991).
71. Id.
72. See Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996); Pinshaw v. Met
ropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988).
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was probably yes,73 in Clickner, the answer was certainly no. 74
In the course of committing the tort at issue, Frederick Monk,
the MDC policeman in Pinshaw, had directed traffic near Fenway
Park,75 sought and obtained a criminal complaint against the plain
tiff in Roxbury District Court,76 and acted as police prosecutor at
the plaintiff's trial.77 The SJC believed that whenever and wherever
Monk engaged in these activities, he was so obviously within the
time and space limits of his employment that the court did not even
need to address the issue.78 On the other hand, Francis M. Water
man, the Lowell policeman in Clickner, was not within the time and
space limits of his employment when, while driving to his scheduled
shift in Lowell, he tried to respond to an emergency call and drove
his automobile across the center line of the road in Groton, hitting
the car in which the Clickners were riding.79 The SJC noted that at
the time of the accident, Waterman "was neither on duty, nor in a
place helpful to his employer."8o
What distinguishes Pinshaw from Clickner is that Monk was at
all times "in a place helpful to his employer," while Waterman, ac
cording to the SJC, was not. 81 This approach taken by the SJC in
determining the "time and space" issue reveals how interconnected
the superficially distinct elements of the Wang test can be, and fre
quently are. To be in a place "helpful'" to one's employer is,
phrased differently, to be in a position to do what one has been
See Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1356.
See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 856.
See Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1353.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1353 n.3.
78. See id. at 1356. The court declared that "Monk's conduct clearly was of the
kind he was hired to perform," satisfying Wang's "job" test. Id. Then, ignoring the
time and space limits of Monk's employment, the court immediately turned to address
the only issue that it found to be in contention, Monk's motivation for his conduct-the
third element of the Wang test. See id. at 1356-57. The SIC concluded that the trial
court judge had erred in ruling that Monk could not reasonably "have believed he was
serving his employer in prosecuting the plaintiff...." See id.
79. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 854.
80. Id. at 855. The appeals court in Kelly did not use the "in a place helpful to his
employer" analysis in discussing why Sergio Peluffo was not within the time and space
limits of his employment as he drove to his job site to pick up his paycheck. See Kelly v.
Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). This phrase from
Clickner, however, helps illuminate the "coming and going" rule that the Kelly court
applied, under which employees traveling to or from work are almost never within the
scope of their employment. Id. at 474-75.
81. For a more detailed analysis of Clickner, including a discussion of whether
Waterman was in fact "in a place helpful to his employer" at the time of his auto acci
dent, see infra Parts II.A. and II.B.
73.
74.
75.
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employed to do. Monk was doing what he was employed to do, so
wherever he was doing it, he was in a "place helpful to his em
ployer." Thus Monk's conduct passed Wang's "time and space" test
because it passed the "job" test. 82 Waterman, on the other hand,
was not in a "place helpful to his employer,"83 which is in large part
why his conduct was found not to be of "'the kind of work which he
was employed to perform."'84 Thus, Waterman's conduct failed
Wang's "job" test mainly because it failed the "time and space" test.
The first element of the Wang test is, as well, frequently intertwined
with the third element, motive, but not nearly to the extent that the
first and second elements are. 85
With the limited exception of Worcester Insurance Co. v. Fells
Acres Day School, Inc. ,86 in every case since Wang, the court has
determined that the employee's conduct either passed both the first
and second parts of the Wang test, or failed both parts. The reason
for this result is most evident in those cases involving white-collar
employees. Such employees may have offices (although even that
is not always the case), but spend little time in them. Their work
days are vaguely defined, if at all. These employees rarely work
shifts and never punch time clocks. White-collar employees work
when and where they have to do the kind of work they are em
ployed to perform. For example, in 604 Columbus Avenue Realty
Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co. (In re 604 Columbus Avenue
Realty Trust),87 a bank employee, Sidney Weiner, helped negotiate
a loan with the plaintiffs and agreed to recommend it to the bank
for which he worked, but only if he received a kickback. 88 In find
ing that Weiner's conduct was within his scope of employment, the
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for analysis of this point.
83. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. This was so even though he was driving a Low
ell-owned vehicle at the time of his accident. See id. at 864. Being in (or on) the em
ployer's property apparently is not enough to place the employee substantially within
the authorized space limits of his or her employment.
84. [d. at 856 (quoting superior court judge's decision).
85. For a discussion of Wang's "motive" test, in general, and its relation to the
"job" test, in particular, see infra Part I.C.3.
86. 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990).
The only factor even arguably supporting the tort plaintiffs' claims under this
theory [of the employer's vicarious liability] is that some of the abuse [of the
children in the care of the day-care center] is alleged to have occurred "within
the authorized time and space limits[,)" ... i.e., at the school during school
hours. Because some of the abuse is alleged to have been committed off the
school grounds, even this factor does not support the plaintiffs.
[d. at 967 (citation omitted).
87. 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992).
88. See id. at 355-57.
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court said nothing specific about when or where any of Weiner's
actions had taken place, but observed that they had all "occurred
substantially within the flexible time and space limits in which the
Bank permitted him to conduct its business."89
It is precisely this flexibility in a white-collar employee's "au
thorized time and space limits" that makes it nearly impossible for a
court to determine whether such an employee's conduct passes
Wang's "time and space" test, except by deciding whether it passes
the "job" test. Thus, in Wang itself, the SJC discussed at length the
kinds of things the employee, Lawrence Joseph, had done and
whether they were of the sort he had been employed to perform. 90
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the court mention where
Joseph was when he undertook' his tortious actiVities, or when he
undertook them. The only comment the court made about Joseph's
conduct in relation to element two of its own test was the simple,
conc1usory statement: "[I]t occurred within the authorized limits of
time and space."91 The court apparently assumed that what Joseph
did, he did at his office at Wang (assuming he had one), or the court
did not care. That Joseph, Wang's "one-man tax department," was
doing tax-related work eVidently "proved" that he was where Wang
"authorized" him to be, when they "authorized" him to be there.
Likewise, in Howard, the SJC discussed at length the em
ployee's questionable conduct and whether it was of the sort she
was employed to perform. 92 The employee, Paula DaVis, the town's
finance committee chairwoman, conversed with another town offi
cial, Robert Mercier, in his office about the town~s need for a new
ambulance. 93 Whether being in Mercier's office instead of in .her
own (or in the finarice committee's meeting room) might have
pushed DaVis outside the scope of her employment either did not
occur to the court or it did not matter. 94 D'aVis was doing what she
was employed to do. 95 As the court noted, an employee "'is au
thorized to do anything which is reasonably regarded as incidental
89. Id. at 371.
90. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164-65,
1167 (Mass. 1986).
91. Id. at 1167.
92. See Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102 passim (Mass. 1986).
93. See id. at 104.
94. 'Although the Howard court acknowledged Wang's importance in establishing
the standards for scope of employment, see id. at 105, it did not specifically apply
Wang's three-part test to the facts in Howard. In a less formulaic way, however, it
considered the same scope of employment factors that the Wang court did.
95. See id. at 106.
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to the work specifically directed or which is usually done in connec
tion with such work. "'96 It was evidently "incidental" to her work
for Davis, a town official, to go to another town official's office in
order to discuss official town business.
Cases like Pinshaw, In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust,
Wang, and Howard show that courts have difficulty keeping sepa
rate the first two elements of the Wang· test. They also show as well
the relative unimportance-even redundancy-of the second ele
ment, the "time and space" requirement. Part two of the test often
collapses back into part one. Rarely is there an independent way
for a court to determine whether an employee's conduct falls within
the time and space limits of his or her employment. Rather, courts
typically answer the "time and space" question the same way they
frame and answer the "job" question..
C.

The "Motive" Test

Finally, in addition to passing Wang's "job" and "time and
space" tests, an employee's conduct must also pass the "motive"
test in order to fall within that employee's scope of employment. 97
This third part of the Wang test determines whether the employee's
conduct was "motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
employer."98 This purpose, however, need only be minimal. "The
fact that the predominant motive of the [employee] is to benefit
himself does not prevent the act from coming within the scope of
employment ...."99 Perhaps Pinshaw demonstrates most graphi
cally how little the employee's conduct can be motivated "by a pur
pose to serve the employer" and still pass the third part of the
Wang test. loo At trial the superior court judge entered summary
judgment for the defendant,101 finding that the MOC police officer
had prosecuted a criminal complaint against the plaintiff as "'a pri
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta' against the plaintiff
...."102 The criminal complaint was dismissed, and Pinshaw subse
quently successfully sued Monk for violating his civil rights.1 03 Nev
[d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958».
97. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass.
1986).
98. !d. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the "motive" test as applied in
Wang, see infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
99. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988).
101. See id. at 1353.
.
102. [d. at 1357 (quoting the superior court judge's decision).
103. See id. at 1353, 1354.
96.
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ertheless, the SJC opined, "[e]ven if Monk was motivated by a
degree of vindictiveness, he also may have believed he was serving
his employer in prosecuting the plaintiff ...."104 Thus, over a vig
orous dissent,10S the court ruled that the MDC was not entitled to
summary judgment, since it was not certain that Monk's motives
were entirely personal.106 Only if an employee's motives are
"purely personal," and his or her actions "in no way connected with
the employer's interests," will the employee's conduct fall outside
the scope of employment. 107
The decision in Wang and In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty
Trust,lOS provide additional examples of employees whose predomi
nant motives were to serve themselves not their employers, yet
whose conduct still passed Wang's "motive" test. In Wang, when he
was hired as a "one-man tax department," Lawrence Joseph began
to work with and supervise Wang's outside tax consultant, Dudley
L. POSt.109 In his four years with Wang, Post generated nearly
$1,400,000 in tax savings for the company.110 Nevertheless, Joseph
sent a memorandum to his supervisors criticizing Post's works, in
sinuating that Post was not saving Wang as much money as he
could, and suggesting that "Post's services could be performed in
house ...."111 The SJC found that Joseph's assertions were" 'not
advanced in good faith"'; rather, "'his alliance with Post was broken
with an intent to advance his own interests within the corpora
tion."'112 Joseph's conduct, which "was akin to the tort of inten
tional interference with contractual relations,"113 led Wang to
terminate Post's contract. 114 Since Post's contract called for him to
be paid a third of the tax savings he generated for Wang,l1S bringing
his tax work in house-where a salaried employee (presumably Jo
seph) would do it-would clearly save Wang money. The court had
Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1360-61 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1357.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992).
109. See Wang Lab., Inc., v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164
(Mass. 1986).
110. See id. at 1164-65.
111. Id. at 1165.
112. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's findings).
113. Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Mass. 1996) (characterizing
"the harm complained of in Wang").
114. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1165.
115. See id. at 1164.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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no doubt that "Joseph was motivated by self-interest .... "116 Still,
Wang might have benefited from Joseph's actions. That he as
sumed his scheme would have saved the corporation some money
showed that Joseph "acted with an intent to serve Wang."117 Jo
seph's motives, though "predominately" personal, were not com
pletely so; therefore, Wang became liable for his tortious
conduct.118
In In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust,119 Sidney Weaver,
the Capitol Bank employee who agreed to recommend that the
plaintiff receive a loan from the bank only after he had "negoti
ated" a kickback for himself,120 appears, like Officer Monk in Pin
shaw, to have been driven by purely personal motives. The
Bankruptcy Court decided otherwise, because Weiner's kickback
plan would have taken money out of the plaintiff's pocket, not the
bank's.121 The court implicitly acknowledged that Weiner's pre
dominant motive was to benefit himself, but stated that it did" 'not
prevent the act from coming within [Weiner's] scope of employ
ment ...."'122 The court noted that "by advancing loan proceeds to
fund kickbacks, Weiner was not only helping himself but was also
helping the Bank earn interest and other substantial fees, all with
little risk . . . ."123 Thus, Capitol Bank was liable for Weiner's
conversion. 124
Neither the SJC in Wang nor the bankruptcy court in In re 604
Columbus Avenue Realty Trust considered the long-term value of
the employees' conduct. If they had, they might have come to a
different conclusion about the "benefits" the employers received.
Wang's "motive" test, however, does not attempt to determine
whether the employer profited by the employee's conduct, only
whether a modicum of the employee's purpose was "to serve the
employer."125 The test, in other words, is prospective, not retro
spective; it judges intent, not result. This has not meant, though,
that courts have limited themselves to a single or simple measure of
employ~e motivation.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1167.
[d.
See id.
119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 356-57.
See id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372 (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 371.
Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
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"Subjective" Motive

Appellate courts are understandably reluctant to declare on
their own that a given employee's motives were purely personal.1 26
How can the appellate court know for sure what motivated the em
ployee to act? A "subjective" motive test looks at motive only from
the employee's perspective: what was the employee thinking, what
was the employee's state of mind at the time he or she undertook
the tortious conduct? This seems to be the inquiry Wang. asks
courts to undertake.n7
Courts face both the general directive not to construe "scope
of employment" restrictively,128 and Wang's specific instruction to
exclude from an employee's scope of employment only those acts
whose motivations are entirely personal. 129 Appellate courts that
apply a "subjective" motive test to an employee's conduct, there
fore, understandably find that rarely will that conduct fail that test.
For example, the courts in Wang, Pins haw, and In re 604 Columbus
Avenue Realty Trust all apply the "subjective" motive test, and all
come to the conclusion that the employees' conduct in those cases
was not driven entirely by personal motives, despite plentiful evi
dence to the contrary .130
Only in the extreme case of Fells Acres has an appellate court
applying the "subjective" motive test concluded that the employees'
purposes were wholly personal. 131 In Fells Acres, day-care workers
were accused of sexually molesting children at their school. 132 It
was so evident to the SJC that the conduct was not within the em
ployees' Scope of employment,133 that the court hardly bothered to
discuss what reasons the employees may have had for assaulting the
126. See, e.g., Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass.
1988). In Pinshaw, the SJC refused to say that police officer Monk's "private counter
attack or personal vendetta" against the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, outside the
scope of Monk's employment. Id. at 1357 (internal quotation marks and citations omit
ted). Summary judgment was inappropriate, the court held, because "[w]hether Monk
acted within the scope of his official duties ... is a question of fact." Id. See supra
notes 100-07 and accompanying text for further discussion of Monk's motives.
127. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (defining the employee's "motive" in terms of
his or her "purpose").
128. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
129. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
130. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts'
decisions regarding the employees' motives in those three cases.
131. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass.
1990).
132. See id. at 963.
133. See id. at 967.
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children. The court simply asserted that the assaults could not have
been in response to anything the children had done, and the em
ployees' motives for the assaults must have been completely per
sonal and not at all "'to serve the employer."'134
2.

"Objective" Motive

If "motive" equates to "purpose,"135 determining motive can
be difficult, since an employee might well conceal the purpose of his
or her conduct, especially if that purpose is at least in part personal.
Consequently, in their efforts to determine motivation, several
courts looked for external evidence that might signal the purposes
for an employee's conduct. 136 These courts, in other words, try to
make Wang's "motive" test "objective."
The Wang test asks whether the employee's conduct was "mo
tivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer."137
Courts using the "subjective" approach pay most of their attention
to the employee's "purpose."138 Courts that try to make Wang's
motive test "objective" focus to a greater extent on whether the
employee's conduct "serv.e[d] the employer," or whether a reason
able person in the employee's position might think that it could.139
These courts, then, look for markers of motive, rather than at states
of mind.
The clearest example of this occurs in Memorial Press. In try
ing to determine the employee's motive in that case, the court faced
a difficult situation: the person who deliberately misprinted the po
lice union's ad in the newspaper was n(!ver identified. 140 Therefore,
even the trial court had no choice but to deduce the employee's
motives from the act itself. The appeals court agreed with the supe
rior court judge's findings that "the misprint was ... contrary to the
134. Id. (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166).
135. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
136. See, e.g., Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996); Kelly v.
Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); International Bhd. of Police
Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
137. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (citation omitted).
138. [d. at 1167; see also 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and
Trust Co. (In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350, 371-72 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992); Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist.
Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass. 1988).
139. See, e.g., Doe, 664 N.E.2d at 820; Kelly, 616 N.E.2d at 475-76; Memorial
Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379.
140. See Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 378. See supra note 30 and accompany
ing text for an elaboration of the facts in Memorial Press.
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newspaper's policies and interests."141 The court noted that" '[t]he
fact that [the] act [was] done in an outrageous or abnormal manner
has value in indicating that the [employee was] not actuated by an
intent to perform the employer's business."'142 The "outrageous or
abnormal" character of the act, together with the fact that it was
"contrary to the newspaper's policies and interests," signaled that
the employee's motives for the deliberate misprint must have been
entirely personal, clearing Memorial Press of liability for the em
ployee's conduct,143
Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 144 was similarly decided. There,
the store's assistant manager allegedly assaulted and raped another
employee; obviously, this was not "the kind of action that Purity
Supreme employed [the assistant store manager] to perform."145
Therefore, his conduct failed Wang's "job" test. The court, how
ever, focused most of its attention on the employee's motives, con
cluding that "rape and sexual assault of an employee do not serve
the interests of the employer," and for this reason the assistant
store manager's conduct failed Wang's "motive" test,146 His ac
tions, to use Memorial Press' language, were "outrageous" and "ab
normal,"147 they could not have been undertaken "to serve the
employer." His conduct thus "objectively" demonstrated that his
motives were entirely self-serving. 148
The appeals court's analysis of motive in Kelly was also "objec
tive."149 On a Friday morning Middlesex closed down the job site
where Sergio Peluffo was working. 150 Peluffo was told that he
could return that afternoon to pick up his paycheck, if he wished, or
he could collect it when he arrived at work the following Mon
141. Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379.
142. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 cmt. c (1958».
143. See id.
144. 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996).
145. Id. at 820.
146. Id.
147. Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379.
148. Doe and Fells Acres are alike in that they both involved alleged sexual abuse
by an employee. However, the court took a slightly different approach to motive in the
two cases. In Fells Acres, a "subjective" motive case, see supra notes 131-34 and accom
panying text, the court simply asserted that the employees' motives must have been
completely personal. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d
958,967 (Mass. 1990). The court made the "motive" test "objective" in Doe by discuss
ing the employee's motives in terms of the employer's interests. See Doe, 664 N.E.2d at
820. The employee's motive must have been completely personal because his conduct
ran counter to the interests of his employer. See id.
149. Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
150. See id. at 474.
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day.1 51 In a pretrial deposition Peluffo acknowledged that he had
been given this choice of times. 152 He chose to pick it up that Fri
day afternoon and was involved in an accident while driving to do
SO.153 The court stated that "[a] jury could not reasonably conclude
... that Middlesex instructed Peluffo to make a special trip for his
check ...."154 The company was statutorily obligated "to make a
paycheck available to its weekly wage earners on Friday, but it was
not in derogation of any interest of Middlesex if a worker chose to
pick up a check the following Monday."155 In determining whether
Peluffo's conduct was motivated even in part "by a purpose to serve
the employer," the Kelly court apparently did not consider what
Peluffo himself might have thought his "purpose" was. Rather, be
cause no "reasonable" juror (that is, no "objective" outsider) could
conclude that Peluffo's motive was anything but personal, it was
personal, and therefore at the time of the accident, Peluffo was not
within the scope of his employment. 156
3. The "Job" Test as the "Motive" Test
The "subjective" approach to motive tries to determine what
the employee was thinking, what he or she intended. 157 The "objec
tive" approach to motive relieves courts of the haziness of "subjec
tive" motive test in that it allows courts to look for external
evidence of intent.1 58 The "objective" test, however, creates a
problem of its own. Once motive becomes objectified, once courts
look for markers that the employee's purpose was "to serve the em
ployer," then Wang's "motive" test almost inevitably begins to fold
back into the "job" test.
Doe is the extreme example of this phenomenon. The em
ployee in that case, who allegedly raped and sexually assaulted a
fellow employee, "was not motivated by a purpose to serve the em
ployer" because "rape and sexual assault of an employee do not
serve the interests of the employer."159 This is motive looked at
151. See id.
152. See id. at 475.
153. See id. at 474.
154. [d. at 475-76.
155. [d. at 476.
156. See id. at 475-76.
157. For a discussion of the "subjective" approach to motive, see supra notes 126
34 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the "objective" approach to motive, see supra notes 135
56 and accompanying text.
159. Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815, 820 (Mass. 1996).
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"objectively." The assistant store manager's conduct, however,
failed the "motive" test for an additional reason: the employer had
not "'authorized or directed [his] conduct ... [and] his action was
[not] the kind of action that [the store] employed him to per
form."'160 Thus, in Wang's terminology, the evidence that the em
ployee was not motivated "by a purpose to serve the employer" was
that his conduct was not "of the kind he [was] employed to per
form."161 The employee's conduct failed the "motive" test, it
seems, in part because it failed the "job" test. In its application of
the "objective" motive test, the Doe court in effect made the test
irrelevant. Once the employee was determined not to be doing
what he was hired to do, his motives had to have been purely
personal.162
A similar blending of Wang's "job" and "motive" tests oc
curred in Memorial Press. There, the employee's deliberate mis
print of a newspaper ad was "done in an outrageous or abnormal
manner," "objectively" showing that the employee "was [not] moti
vated by a desire to promote the newspaper's interests."163 As fur
ther evidence of the personal nature of the employee's motives, the
court observed that "the misprint was unauthorized [and] uncon
doned ...."164 Whether an employer "authorizes" or "condones"
the employee's actiop.s, however, indicates much more about
whether the employee is doing what he or she was employed to
do-Wang's "job" test-than about his or her motives 'for doing it.
The SJC's analysis of motive in Pinshaw was primarily "subjec
tive,"165 but not exclusively so. The court, looking at motive from
the employee's perspective, felt that Officer Monk may have "be
lieved he was serving his employer"166 when he undertook his" 'pri
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta' against the plaintiff
.."167 Furthermore, the court found "objective;' evidence that
160. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's decision).
161. Wang Lab., Inc. 'v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass.
1986) (citations omitted).
162. This is not to suggest that Doe was wrongly decided; far from it. Who would
argue that sexual assault and rape should be within any employee's scope of employ
ment? It is only to suggest that in reaching the right outcome, the Doe court dimin
ished the value of the Wang test, which the Doe court claimed to be applying.
163. International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575
N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of "subjec
.
tive" motive in Pinshaw.
166. Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass. 1988).
167. Id. 1357 (quoting superior court judge's decision).
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Monk's conduct may have served his employer's purposes, in that
the MDC "knew of [his] retaliatory action ... [and] may have en
dorsed or ratified [it]."168 Yet this observation says much less about
Monk's intentions than about his superiors'. The "endorsed or rati
fied" wording in Pinshaw is remarkably close to the language that
the Wang court employed to explain how it knew that Wang's em
ployee was doing the kind of work he was employed to perform
when his efforts led Wang to violate its contract with an outside tax
consultant,169 This must have been "the kind of conduct [the em
ployee] was [hired] to perform," the court said, in part because it
was "repeatedly endorsed and utilized by Wang's executives."17o
Even the SJC's refusal in Fells Acres to elaborate on its asser
tion that the day-care workers' motives for allegedly molesting chil
drenat the school were wholly personal,l71 can be read as the
court's disinclination to maintain a clear separation between the
"job" and the "motive" parts of the Wang test. In Fells Acres, the
court seems to be saying that, since the assaults were so clearly not
the kind of acts these employees were hired to perform, they could
not have been motivated, even in part, "'by a purpose to serve the
employ~r."'l72 In this context, at least, the evidence for, and the
analysis of, Wang's "motive" test is identical to that for the "job"
test,173
.
168. [d.
.
169. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167
(Mass. 1986).
170. [d. (emphasis added). Kelly cites Pinshaw for the proposition that an em
ployee's motives are purely personal if his or her conduct is "unconnected in any way
with the employer's interests ...." Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 474
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993). This is not really a fair summary of the Pinshaw court's discus
. sion of the "motive" test. What it captures, however, is the way in which Pinshaw blurs
the line between the "motive" and the "job" tests. Conduct which is unconnected with
the employer's interests is conduct no employee is hired to perform, regardless of his or
her motives for performing it.
17l. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass.
1990). See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wang's "mo
tive" test as applied in Fells Acres.
172. Fells Acres, 558 N.E.2d at 967 (citation omitted).
173. Another case that can be read this way is Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 673
N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Mass. 1996). There, an off-duty National Guardsman, Michael Mor
gante, served a fellow Guardsman, Robert LaCasse, some drinks. See id. at 1218. La
Casse was then involved in a motor vehicle accident while under the influence of the
alcohol. See id. The SJC concluded that because Morgante had not been paid or re
quested by his superiors to bartend, his conduct was not '''of the kind he [was] em
ployed to perform'" and that it was not '''motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the [Commonwealth).'" [d. at 1219 (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166). The
measure for part three of the Wang test was no different from the measure for part one.
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As discussed above, courts often have trouble keeping separate
the "job" and the "time and space" elements of Wang's scope of
employment test. 174 Occasionally they have the same trouble sepa
rating the "job" and "motive" elements. 175 This is especially true
for those courts tempted by the beguiling but oxymoronic mirage of
"objective" motives. For if there are external indicators of an em
ployee's desire to further the purposes of his or her employer, what
can they be other than that the employee is trying to do whatever
he or she was employed to perform?
II.

CLICKNER V. CITY OF LOWELL AND BEYOND

In April of 1996, the SIC decided Clickner v. City of Lowell. 176
This decision signaled that the SIC would no longer be bound by
Wang's, approach to scope of employment analysis. 177 Though
nominally relying on Wang in its decision,178 the Clickner court
turned away from Wang's division of scope of employment into
three distinct and apparently exhaustive categoriesP9 Unlike pre
vious courts, the SIC in Clickner did not find that Wang circum
scribed the boundaries of scope of employment analysis; instead,
the three-part Wang test merely enumerated some of the "[f]actors
to be considered" in determining whether an employee's acts fell
within his or her scope of employment. 18o Since the Clickner deci
sion, Wang has not completely relinquished its hold on scope of
employment jurisprudence;181 on the other hand, neither does it to
tally control the field as it did before Clickner.182
174. See supra Part I.B.
175. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
176. 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996).
177. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163 (Mass.
1986).
178. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855.
179. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
180. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (citing Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166).
181. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Mass. 1996),
(ignoring Clickner and relying entirely on Wang; asserting that Wang "set forth the
factors relevant to scope of employment determinations"); see also Doe v. Purity
Supreme, 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996). Doe is another post-Clickner case that relies
entirely on Wang and makes no mention of Clickner. This may be so because Clickner
and Doe were decided so close together in time-the former in April, the latter in
May-that by the time Doe was decided, Clickner had not yet registered as relevant
precedent; neither side in Doe could have known about or relied on Clickner in its
arguments.
182. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1045 (D. Mass. 1996), (ap
plying Massachusetts scope of employment law and relying primarily on Clickner, not
Wang).
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The Clickner Case

Francis M. Waterman, a Lowell policeman, was driving to work
when he crossed "the center line of the road and collided with the
motor vehicle in which the Clickners were riding," injuring them. 183
The accident occurred in the town of Groton, at about 4:50 in the
afternoon.1 84 Waterman was trying to get to his five-o'clock shift in
Lowell after spending the day in Groton playing golf and drink
ing.1 85 The car he was in belonged to the Lowell Police Depart
ment, which had allowed Waterman to drive it to his golf
tournament so that he could "report for his shift or . . . respond
immediately to any emergency calls without returning home."I86
He had crossed the center line while attempting to use the cellular
phone in the car to respond to a page from the Lowell police sta
tion. 187 Waterman was later "found guilty of operating [a motor
vehicle] while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and failure
to yield. "188
At trial, the superior court judge ruled that Lowell was not lia
ble for Waterman's conduct because he was not acting within the
scope of his employment.1 89 When Waterman appealed, the SJC
affirmed the trial court's ruling.1 90
The SJC began its discussion of scope of employment law with
the well-established basics-that "'[t]he scope of an employee's
employment is not construed restrictively,"'191 and that Wang had
set down a three-part test for determining whether an employee's
conduct was within his or her scope of employment. l92 What the
Clickner facts showed the court was that, in effect, Officer Water
man's actions failed at least the first two parts of the test.1 93 He was
in Groton, not Lowell, which meant he was not "in a place helpful
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 854.
See id.
See id.
[d.
See id.

188.

[d.

189. See id.
190. See id.
191. [d. at 855 (quoting Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105
(Mass. 1987) and citing Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (Mass. 1983».
192. See id. In the court's view, however, the Wang test was not exhaustive. It
was, rather, among the "[f]actors to be considered" in determining whether an em
ployee acted within the scope of his or her employment. [d.
193. See id. at 855 n.5. Because the Clickner court did not rely solely on the
Wang test in deciding that Officer Waterman's conduct was not within his scope of
employment, it is unclear to what degree Wang's approach to scope of employment
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to his employer,"194 and "his shift had not yet begun."195 Thus, Wa
terman's conduct implicitly failed Wang's "time and space" test. 196
In addition, although Waterman was in a city-owned vehicle at the
time of the accident, he "was not being paid at that time[,] ... he
was intoxicated and unfit for duty[,] ... [and he] was not acting in
the furtherance of the employer's business ...."197 "[T]he mere
fact of being on call, [which Waterman was]," the court maintained,
"does not place employees within the scope of their employ
ment."198 Thus, Waterman's conduct implicitly failed Wang's "job"
test as well. 199 The SJC did not apply the "motive" part of Wang's
test. 2oo The court said, however, that "Waterman's actions through
out the day of the accident were in the furtherance of his own
agenda. "201
The only difficult question the court faced was "whether [Wa
terman's] act of responding to the page was enough to tip the bal
ance and to bring his conduct within the scope of [his] employment
...."202 That conduct did not "tip the balance," the SJC decided,
agreeing with the trial court's ruling that '''[t]he mere fact that just
prior to [the accident] Waterman was attempting to contact his
subordinate by cellular telephone in response to her page does not
work an electronic alchemy and transmute his entire course of con
duct into the kind of work which he was employed to perform."'203
Therefore, Waterman's conduct was not within the scope of his em
ployment, and Lowell was not liable for the. injuries he caused the
Clickners.204
analysis. shaped or governed the court's thinking in Clickner. See infra Part II.C. for
further discussion of this point.
194. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 855 n.5.
197. Id..at 855.
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. See id. at 855 n.5.
200. The court noted the potential applicability of Wang's "motive" test, but then
observed that Clickner is different from Wang in that "in the present case .... the em
ployee was not acting within the authorized limits of time and space and ... his conduct
was not clearly that which he was hired to perform." Id. This comment suggests that
the court felt it was unnecessary to analyze Waterman's motives. His conduct was not
within his scope of employment, regardless of his motives.
201. Id. at 856.
202. Id.
203. Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting the superior court judge's decision).
204. See id. at 854, 856.
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The Clickner Decision

The result reached by the SJC in Clickner seems wrong for two
reasons. First, the court found Waterman's drunkenness to be a
perhaps the-significant factor in determining that his conduct
failed Wang's "job" test. Waterman, the SJC observed, was "intoxi
cated and unfit for duty" at the time of the accident.205 Later the
court returned to the issue of Waterman's inebriated state: "He had
... consumed an amount of beer sufficient to render him intoxi
cated.... [H]e was not permitted to perform his job while intoxi
cated, and ... he was not fit for duty at the time of the accident. "206
Yet what employee is ever "permitted to perform his job while in
toxicated"? What employee is ever "fit for duty" when drunk? In
ebriation is not part of anyone's job description; that fact alone,
however, should not eliminate the employer's liability for an inebri
ated employee's conduct. Intoxication frequently figures in scope
of employment cases, but courts do not generally find it determina
tive. 207 The question should not be whether the employee was
drunk; the question should be what did the employee do while
drunk? That Officer Waterman was intoxicated is a fact, but it
should not dispose of the question-one way or the other-as to
whether when his car ran into the Clickners' he was doing his job as
a Lowell policeman.
.
The second reason the SJC erred in deciding that Waterman's
conduct was not within his scope of employment relates to the
emergency call he received. The court maintained, fairly enough,
that merely being "on call" did not automatically put Waterman (or
any other employee) within the scope of his employment. 20g The
court went further, however, and ruled that Waterman's attempt to
respond to the page from the Lowell police department did not
"'work an electronic alchemy and transmute his entire course of
conduct into the kind of work which he was employed to per
form."'209 This ruling was crucial, because it was just at the moment
that Waterman was trying·to answer the page on his cellular phone
that he swerved across the center line and into the vehicle in which
the Clickners were riding. 2lO
The Clickner court expressed concern that "an overbroad in
.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

.

See id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-30, 233, 236-37 (1958).
See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855.
.
Id. at 856 (quoting the superior court judge's decision).
See id. at 854.
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terpretation" of scope of employment would "create unreasonable
liability for municipalities."211 Perhaps for that reason the SJC nar
rowly restricted Waterman's scope of employment to the city of
Lowell, during his assigned shift.212 The police department, how
ever, had permitted Waterman to drive one of its cars, with its cellu
lar phone, to his golf tournament so that he could "respond
immediately to any emergency calls . . . ."213 He had, in other
words, been directed to take such calls, presumably regardless of
whether he was in Lowell or whether it was after his shift's starting
time of 5:00 p.m. If the employer directs the employee to under
take some course of action or if the employer "endorse[s] and util
ize[s]" the employee's conduct, Wang says, those actions fall within
the employee's scope of employment. 214 In this electronic age "al
chemical" reactions such as occurred in Clickner are commonplace.
The instant the police department paged Waterman, it asked him to
begin to do the kind of work he was "employed to. perform," at a
time and in a place where he had been "authorized" to act. Thus, at
that moment Waterman's conduct entered within the scope of his
employment.215
C.

Clickner's Analysis Versus Wang's

The outcome in Clickner appears to limit employer liability in
scope of employment cases more than the Wang court intended.
First, the SJC said in Clickner that the employee, the police officer
Waterman, was not within his scope of employment because "his
conduct was not clearly that which he was hired to perform."216
This use of the word clearly suggests a retreat from the broad inter
pretation of scope of employment found in Wang and its prog
eny.217 It also contradicts the court's assertion that "'[t]he scope of
211. Id. at 854-55.
212. See id. at 855.
213. Id. at 854.
214. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass.
1986); see also Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass.
1988) (finding that police officer's superiors who knew about his tortious conduct may
have "endorsed or ratified [his] action").
215. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166.
216. Id. at 855 n.5 (emphasis added).
217. See, e.g., Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass.
1988); Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1987); International Bhd.
of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991).
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an employee's employment is not construed restrictively.'''218
Clickner effectively reverses that presumption. Taken at face value,
Clickner shifts the burden of proof regarding whether an em
ployee's conduct is within his or her scope of employment in a way
beneficial to employers. 219 Scope of employment cases-especially
those that reach appellate courts-must often arise at the margin
between "scope" and "not scope." Clickner encourages future
courts to pull those margins in toward the certain center.
Second, the Clickner court did not find the Wang test for scope
of employment exhaustive, as had previous courts.220 Rather, it
listed Wang's three-part test as among the "[f]actors to be consid
ered."221 The court never set forth, however, what "factors" it be
lieved relevant to scope of employment that do not fit into one of
the Wang test's three categories. Officer Waterman's inebriation
appears to be the only possible such factor. It made him, the court
said, "unfit for duty."222 Yet Waterman's drunkenness-to the ex
tent that it should even have been considered223-only made it so
that he could not do his job properly.224 That is, Waterman was
unable to undertake the kind of work he was employed to perform.
Being "unfit for duty," in other words, is really no different from an
inability to pass Wang's "job" test. 225
218. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (quoting Howard, 506 N.E.2d at 105 (citing
Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983))).
219. Cj. Howard, 506 N.E.2d at 105 (finding that taxpayers who filed a lawsuit to
prevent Burlington from indemnifying the town's finance committee chairwoman in a
defamation action brought against her "had the burden of proof on the issue" of
whether her conduct was within the scope of her employment).
220. With the possible exception of Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993), no pre-Clickner case that employed the Wang three-part test for
scope of employment analyzed the employee's conduct except in terms of that test. In
Kelly, too, the appeals court put the employee's conduct under the Wang microscope.
Then, however, the court mentioned "certain additional factors" it found relevant in
determining that the employee-apparently a construction worker, who was involved in
an automobile accident while voluntarily returning to his closed-down job site to pick
up his paycheck-was not within the scope of his employment. [d. at 476. Among
these "additional factors" were that the employee was "off duty," that "he was not on
call," and that his "conduct at the time of the accident was independent of the require
ments or interests of his employer ...." /d. These "additional factors" are, of course,
not additional at all, but are exactly the kinds of factors that can easily be fit into the
Wang test categories.
221. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855.
222. [d.
223. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ques
tionable relevance of Officer Waterman's inebriation.
224. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 856.
225. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166
(Mass. 1986).
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Third, the Clickner court converted Wang's relatively clear "el
ements" test into a vague "balancing" test. 226 In Clickner, the SJC
set forth the factors that suggested Waterman was within his scope
of employment and weighed them against those that suggested he
was not. 227 The court specifically asked whether Waterman's "act
of responding to the page [from the Lowell police] was enough to
tip the balance and to bring his conduct within the scope of employ
ment. . . ."228 Balancing tests are often imprecise; when courts
weigh factors, both the choice of factors to be weighed and the
weight each is assigned can become subjective. Thus, the outcome
of lawsuits in areas of law governed by balancing tests can be un
predictable. Wang's three-part test for scope of employment,
though not without its problems,229 at least provides potential liti
gants with a clearer sense of how that issue will be analyzed by the
courts than does Clickner's "balancing test" approach.
D.

The Post-Clickner Future

The future of scope of employment jurisprudence in Massachu
setts remains uncertain. Appellate courts have had only a few occa
sions on which to address scope of employment questions since the
SJC's decision in Clickner. In the first post-Clickner case, Doe v.
Purity Supreme, Inc.,239 the SJC ignored Clickner, which had been
handed down barely a week earlier,231 and looked at the scope of
employment question through the Wang lens. 232 The court in
Timpson v. Transamerica Insurance Company,233 a case decided six
months ~fter Clickner, performed the sa1?e analysis. There, the
court discussed the Wang test extensively, but never even men
tioned Clickner.234
Only in Armstrong v. Lamy,235 a federal district court case ap
plying Massachusetts scope of employment law, did a court seem
226.
227.
228.
not, since
Id.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855-56.
See id.
Id. at 856 (emphasis added). The court determined, of course, that it was
Waterman's drunkenness clearly "tipped the balance" in the other direction.
See supra Parts LB. and LC.3.
664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996).
Clickner was decided on April 25, 1996; Doe on May 3, 1996.
See Doe, 664 N.E.2d at 820.
669 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
See id. at 1095-96.
938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1996).
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ingly rely on Clickner, rather than Wang, as its primary authority.236
The district court may have done this because it. thought that
Clickner's balancing-test approach now governs scope of employ
ment law in Massachusetts. It is far more likely, however, that the
Armstrong court relied on Clickner because both cases arose in the
context of public-employer liability for public-employee misconduct
under the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act. 237 Indeed, the test the
Armstrong court then used to determine if the employee's conduct
was within his scope of employment was the Wang test, as quoted in
Clickner.238 In Burroughs v. Commonwealth,239 the SJC itself once
again found the relevant scope of employment formulation in
Wang, not Clickner.24o The Burroughs court also cited Kansallis
Finance Ltd. v. Fern 241 -a case involving a phiintiff's reliance on the
apparent authority of a partner in a partnership-for the proposi
tion that "'[t]he scope of employment test asks the question: is this
the kind of thing that in a general way employees of this kind do in
employment of this kind."'242 By approving the "in a general way"
approach to scope of employment, the Burroughs court seemed to
be returning to the nonrestrictive construction of scope of employ
ment articulated in Commonwealth v. Jerez ,243 and acknowledged
by the SJC in subsequent cases,244 but that had been implicitly re
jected in Clickner.245
If these recent cases are any indication, the Clickner decision is
something of an aberration. So far, fortunately, it has had slight
impact on how courts approach scope of employment questions.
Courts have declined to accept-and may not even have recog
nized-Clickner's invitation to reconfigure scope of employment
236. See id. at 1045. The court noted, however, that Clickner itself relied on
Wang's three-part test to provide "factors to be considered" in the scope of employ
ment analysis. Id.
237. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1994); see also Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at
1045 ("[In Clickner], [t]he Supreme Judicial Court ... had occasion to consider the
meaning of the phrase 'acting within the scope of his office or employment,' as that
phrase is used in § 2 of the MTCA.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Clickner v.
City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Mass. 1996).
238. See Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at 1045.
239. 673 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1996).
240. See id. at 1219 ("[Wang] set[s] forth the factors relevant to scope of employ
ment determinations ....") (emphasis added).
241. 659 N.E.2d 731 (Mass. 1996).
242. Burroughs, 673 N.E.2d at 1219 (quoting Kansallis, 659 N.E.2d at 735).
243. 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983).
244. See, e.g., Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Mass. 1987).
245. 663 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Mass. 1996) (court quotes Howard favorably but de
fines scope of employment restrictively).
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analysis. Wang still delineates scope of employment law in Massa
chusetts. Clickner, with its questionable outcome and opaque bal
ancing test, provides a far less reliable precedent than do Wang and
its progeny. Clickner makes results-driven analysis too easy and
too tempting. If the Clickner approach prevails, a court would be
free to select whatever factors it wanted to consider, and to balance
those factors as it chose, in deciding whether an employee's conduct
fell within his or her scope of employment. On the other hand,
Wang's three-part test, however imperfect, is exhaustive; it gives
courts and litigants clear ground rules for determining the bounda
ries of an employee's scope of employment. In the final analysis
this is fairer to all than the most careful balancing of an ever chang
ing set of scope of employment "factors."

